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Abstract
We pursue a general theory of quantum games. We show that
quantum games are more efficient than classical games, and provide a
saturated upper bound for this efficiency. We demonstrate that the set
of finite classical games is a strict subset of the set of finite quantum
games. We also deduce the quantum version of the Minimax Theorem
and the Nash Equilibrium Theorem.
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The field of quantum games is currently attracting much attention
within the physics community [1, 2, 3, 4]. In addition to their own
intrinsic interest, quantum games offer a new vehicle for exploring the
fascinating world of quantum information [3, 4, 5]. So far, research
on quantum games has tended to concentrate on finding interesting
phenomena when a particular classical game is quantized. As a result,
studies of quantum games have centered on particular special cases
rather than on the development of a general theoretical framework.
This paper aims to pursue the general theory of quantum games.
We are able to identify a definite sense in which quantum games are
‘better’ than classical games, in terms of their efficiency. We show
explicitly that, in terms of the number of (qu)bits required, there
can be a factor of 2 increase in efficiency if we play games quantum
mechanically. Hence we are able to quantify a distinct advantage of
quantum games as compared to their classical counterparts. Further-
more, through the formalism developed, we are able to demonstrate
that the set of finite classical games is a strict subset of finite quantum
games. Namely, all finite classical games can be played by quantum
rules but not vice versa. We also deduce the quantum version of two
of the most important theorems in classical game theory: the minimax
theorem for zero-sum games and the Nash theorem for general static
games.
We start by defining what is meant by a game. In game theory,
a game consists of a set of players, a set of rules which dictate what
actions a player can take, and a payoff function specifying the reward
for a given set of played strategies. In other words, it is a triple
〈N,Ω, P 〉 where N is the number of players, Ω = ×kΩk with 1 ≤
k ≤ N such that each set Ωk is the set of strategies for the k-th
player, and P : Ω → RN such that each Pk(.) with 1 ≤ k ≤ N is the
payoff function for the k-th player. Without loss of generality, we can
imagine the existence of a referee who computes the corresponding
payoff function after he receives the strategies being played by each
of the players. This formal structure includes all classical games and
all quantum games. In other words any game, whether classical or
quantum, is fully described by the corresponding triple 〈N,Ω, P 〉. On
the other hand, given any triple 〈N,Ω, P 〉, it is not hard to imagine a
purely classical game that might be associated to it.
So in what sense are quantum games any ‘better’ than classical
games? We believe that the answer lies in the issue of efficiency.
Although any game could be played classically, the physically feasible
ones form a very restricted subset. As we have seen, playing a game
is ultimately about information exchange between the players and the
referee - hence if a particular game requires you to submit an infinite
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amount of information before the payoff functions can be computed, it
will not be a playable game. In other words, we are interested in those
games which require only a finite amount of resources and time to
play. Hence a connection can be made between this consideration and
the study of algorithms. In the study of computation, we learn that
there are computable functions which may however not be computed
efficiently. Shor’s great contribution to information theory was to
advance the boundary of the set of efficiently computable functions
[6]. This naturally begs the question as to whether it is more efficient
to play games quantum mechanically than classically. We will show
shortly that, in terms of efficiency, some quantum games can indeed
outperform classical games.
The quantum game protocol that we study is a generalization of
that described in [2]. We use the term static quantum games to reflect
the similarity of the resulting games to static classical games. To
play a static quantum game, we start with an initial state ρ which is
represented by qubits. The referee then divides the state into N sets
of qubit parts, sending the k-th set to player k. The players separately
operate on the qubits that they receive, and then send them back to
the referee. The referee then determines the payoff for the players with
regard to the measurement outcome of a collection of POVM operators
{Mm}. Anticipating the focus on efficiency, we fix the dimension of ρ
to be 2qN where qN is the number of qubits, and we set n = 2q. We
also assume that the players share the initial qubits equally, i.e. each
one of them will receive q qubits. This assumption is inessential and is
for ease of exposition only. Following the game’s protocol, the players
operate independently on the states, and hence it is natural to allow
them access to all possible physical maps. Specifically, we allow each
player to have access to the set of trace-preserving completely positive
maps, i.e. for each k, we set Ωk to be the set of trace-preserving
completely positive maps. Indeed, the only way to restrict the players’
strategy sets in this protocol is to perform some measurement at the
referee’s end - this is incorporated into our formalism by allowing the
referee the set of all POVM operators.
First, we restrict ourselves to two-player games. If a payoff of akm
for player k is associated with the measurement outcomem, the payoff
for player k is then tr(Rkπ) where Rk := ak1M
†
1M1 + · · · + a
k
LM
†
LML
and π is the resulting state. For example, if player I decides to use
operation E = {Ek} and player II F = {Fk}, then π =
∑
k,l(Ek ⊗
Fl)ρ(E
†
k ⊗ F
†
l ). Hence PI(E ,F) =
∑
k,l tr(R
I(Ek ⊗ Fl)ρ(E
†
k ⊗ F
†
l )).
We now fix a set of operators {E˜α} which will form a basis for the
set of operators in the state space. If E = {Ek =
∑
α ekαE˜α} and
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F = {Fl =
∑
α flαE˜α}, then the payoff is∑
k,l,α,β,γ,δ
ekαekβflγflδA
k
αβγδ
where Akαβγδ := tr[R
k(E˜α⊗ E˜γ)ρ(E˜
†
β⊗ E˜
†
δ)]. Letting χαβ =
∑
k ekαekβ
and ξγδ =
∑
l flγflδ, then χ and ξ are positive hermitian matrices
with 16q − 4q independent real parameters. Note that the number
16q comes from the fact that 16q real parameters are needed to spec-
ify a 4q × 4q positive hermitian matrix, while 4q comes from the fact
that
∑
α,β χαβE˜
†
αE˜β = I with the assumptions that χ is positive and
hermitian. This procedure is the same as the so-called chi matrix rep-
resentation [7]. For a general matrix Ξ, we now observe that tr(Ξ) =
tr(Ξ†). Hence we have χαβξγδAαβγδ = χβαξδγAβαδγ . Therefore, the
payoff is actually
∑
α,β,γ,δ Re[χαβξγδAαβγδ], which is always real as ex-
pected. To recap, the strategy sets for the players are {χ}, {ξ}: these
are subsets of the set of positive hermitian matrices such that∑
α,β
χαβE˜
†
αE˜β = I ,
∑
α,β
ξαβE˜
†
αE˜β = I. (1)
The payoff is given by
∑
α,β,γ,δ Re[χαβξγδAαβγδ ]. As shown above, we
may now identify Ωk to be the set of positive semi-definite hermitian
matrices satisfying condition (1). It then follows that Ω = ×kΩk is a
convex, compact Euclidean space.
The above analysis can easily be generalized to N -player games.
For a particular N -player static game, Pk(~χ) =
∑
χ1 · · ·χNAk where
Ak = tr[Rk(E˜ ⊗ · · · ⊗ E˜)ρ(E˜ ⊗ · · · ⊗ E˜)] (index summation omitted
for clarity).
We can now see a striking similarity between static quantum games
and static classical finite games. The payoff for a classical finite two-
player game has the form
∑
i,j xiAijyj where x, y belong to some
multi-dimensional simplexes and A is a general matrix—the payoff
for a static quantum game is
∑
α,β,γ,δ χαβξγδAαβγδ where χ, ξ be-
long to some multi-dimensional compact and convex sets Ωk. Indeed
the multi-linear structure of the payoff function and the convexity
and compactness of the strategy sets, are the essential features un-
derlying both classical and quantum games. And one may exploit
these similarities to extend some classical results into the quantum
domain. Two immediate examples are the Nash equilibrium The-
orem and the Minmax Theorem. To show this, we first need to
recall some relevant definitions. For a vector ~v = (vi)i∈N , we set
~v−k to be (vi)i∈N\{k} and we denote (v1, . . . , vk−1, v′k, vk+1, . . . , vN ) by
(~v−k, v′k). We also define the set of best replies for player k to be
Bk(~χ−k) := {χk ∈ Ωk : Pk(~χ−k, χk) ≥ Pk(~χ−k, χ′k),∀χ
′
k ∈ Ωk}. We
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note that for each k, Bk(~χ−k) is convex and closed in Ωk and hence
compact. Using the notion of best reply, we can easily define what
a Nash equilibrium is: an operator profile ~χ is a Nash equilibrium if
χk ∈ Bk(~χ−k) for all k.
Theorem 1 (Quantum Nash Equilibrium Theorem)
For all static quantum games, at least one Nash equilibrium exists.
Proof: We know that Ω is a convex compact subset of a Euclidean
space. Since B = ×kBk is an upper semi-continuous point-to-set map
which takes each ~χ ∈ Ω to a convex set B(~χ) ⊆ Ω, the theorem follows
from Kakutani’s fixed point theorem [8]. Q.E.D.
We now restrict ourselves to two-player zero-sum game, i.e., aIm =
−aIIm for all m. Trivially, given any χ, player I’s payoff is bounded
above by
v(χ) = min
ξ∈ΩII
∑
α,β,γ,δ
χαβξγδAαβγδ.
Similarly, given any ξ, player II’s payoff is bounded below by
v(ξ) = max
χ∈ΩI
∑
α,β,γ,δ
χαβξγδAαβγδ .
We therefore define
vI := max
χ∈ΩI
min
ξ∈ΩII
∑
α,β,γ,δ
χαβξγδAαβγδ,
vII := min
ξ∈ΩII
max
χ∈ΩI
∑
α,β,γ,δ
χαβξγδAαβγδ.
Theorem 2 (Quantum Minimax Theorem)
vI = vII.
Proof: We have seen that for each k, Ωk is compact and convex as
a Euclidean space. Also the payoff is linear and continuous in χαβ
and ξαβ . Therefore, the theorem follows from the Minimax theorem
in Ref. [9]. Q.E.D.
We note that the proofs of theorem 1 and theorem 2 are completely
analogous to the corresponding classical proofs. This is because the
underlying theorems involved - Katutani’s theorem and the Minmax
theorem - are general enough to allow for compact and convex strategy
sets without restricting them to only be simplexes. We also note that
although quantum games can profit from some nice classical results,
5
problematic issues in classical game theory also carry over to quan-
tum games. For example, one would expect multiple Nash equilibira in
general quantum games. Classical game theorists have invented evo-
lutionary game theory [10] to deal with this problem and its quantum
analogy awaits full development [11].
If quantum games were merely some replicas of classical games,
or vice versa, the subject of quantum games would not be very inter-
esting. Here we show that quantum games are more than that, by
showing that in comparison with classical games, not only the set of
finite quantum games is strictly larger, quantum games can also be
played more efficiently. Before we do this, however, we need to dis-
cuss how to quantify efficiency in both classical and quantum cases,
and how we then compare the resulting efficiencies. We have seen
that the quantum strategy set Ωk is a conpact and convex Euclidean
space. Since any compact and convex Euclidean space lies inside some
m-dimensional simplex, yet at the same time contains a smaller m-
dimensional simplex as a subset where m is unique and equals 16q−4q
for Ωk. The dimensionality will be the quantity we use to gauge effi-
ciency, because it is well-defined and reflects the number of (qu)bits
needed. For example, in order to play a two-player quantum game
we need to exchange 4q qubits in total. This is because the referee
needs to send q qubits to the two players and they then need to send
them back. The strategy set for each player has dimension 16q−4q. If
the same number of bit-transfers is allowed in a classical game, then
the strategy set for each player will be a simplex of dimension 4q − 1.
Therefore, does it mean that we have a factor of 2 increase in effi-
ciency by playing quantum games? It is true in general, but is not
immediately obvious: although the quantum strategy set has a higher
dimension, we do not yet know whether many of the strategies are
redundant or not.
In order to show that general quantum games are indeed more
efficient, we first perform some concrete calculations. Since the choice
of {E˜α} is arbitrary, we take {E˜α} = {n[ij]} where n[ij] denotes a n×n
square matrix such that (ij)-entry = 1 and all other entries are equal
to 0. Denoting α by ij and using condition (1), we have the following
restrictive conditions on χ:
∑
i χijij = 1 and
∑
i χijil = 0, where the
first two sub-indices represent α while the latter two represent β. A
further calculation shows that n[ij] ⊗ n[kl] = n
2
[(i−1)n+k,(j−1)n+l]. For
arbitrary R and ρ, we find the following:
A ab︸︷︷︸
α
cd︸︷︷︸
β
ij︸︷︷︸
γ
kl︸︷︷︸
δ
= R((c−1)n+k),((a−1)n+i) × ρ((b−1)n+j),((d−1)n+l).
We are now ready to prove the following theorem:
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Theorem 3 Aαβγδ is diagonal with non-zero diagonal entries for some
ρ and R.
Proof: We first note that the diagonal elements of A are
Aabcdabcd = R((n+1)d−n),((n+1)a−n) × ρ((n+1)b−n),((n+1)c−n).
Therefore for all a, b, c, d, we set
R((n+1)d−n),((n+1)a−n) = 1/n,
ρ((n+1)b−n),((n+1)c−n) = 1/n.
We then set all the other entries of R and ρ to be 0. Q.E.D.
[We note that the above construction still holds true in multi-player
games. A will be a tensor with vanishing entries, except for entries
with identical indices.] Any two operations by player I, χ and χ′,
are redundant if PI(χ, ξ) = PI(χ
′, ξ) for all ξ. However in the above
game, PI(χ, ξ) =
∑
α,β Re[χαβξαβ] 6= PI(χ
′, ξ) =
∑
α,β Re[χ
′
αβξαβ] in
general. Therefore, the payoff depends on all of the independent pa-
rameters and there are 16q − 4q of them. Hence, the upper bound
on efficiency is indeed saturated. One could also envisage varying ρ
and R infinitesimally to provide a continuum of quantum games with
superior efficiency.
We now provide an example. We consider a two-qubit two-player
zero-sum game, and take
ρ =


1/2 0 0 1/2
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1/2 0 0 1/2

 ; R =


1/2 0 0 1/2
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1/2 0 0 1/2

 .
This means that ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ| where |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉) and R =
|ψ〉〈ψ|. For example, the referee may do a von Neumann measure-
ment on the state with respect to the orthonormal basis {|ψ〉, |01〉,
|10〉, 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉)}; and then award a payoff of 1 for each player
if the outcome is |ψ〉, and a payoff of 0 for any other outcomes. The
strategy set in this game is of dimension 12, which corresponds to13
independent strategies classically—therefore at least 8 bits have to be
transferred. This is in contrast with the fact that only 4 qubits needed
to be transferred in the quantum version. The above game, although
reasonably simple, does therefore highlight the potential of quantum
games.
Besides efficiency, we will now show that quantum games are in-
deed strictly more general as claimed. Firstly of all, we note that the
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classical strategy set and the quantum strategy set cannot be made
identical if the linearity of the payoff function is to be preserved. This
is because there is no linear homeomorphism that maps Ωk to a sim-
plex of any dimension. In essense the positivity of Ωk, i.e, the condi-
tions χααχββ ≥ |χαβ |
2 for all χ ∈ Ωk, spoils this possibility. Therefore,
if we identify Ωk as some multi-dimensional simplex, we must lose lin-
earity of the payoff function. On the other hand, we have seen that
every strategy in Ωk is non-redundant in the above games, it is there-
fore impossible to play the above game classically no matter how you
enlarge the strategy set (still finite, of course).
Conversely, we show by an example how classical games can be
played within the formalism of quantum games. We consider a general
two-player two-move game, the game being classical naturally suggests
that the initial qubits are not entangled and the payoffs are determined
by measuring the resulting qubits with respect to the computational
basis. Hence, without loss of generality,
ρ =


1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

 and Rk =


rk11 0 0 0
0 rk12 0 0
0 0 rk21 0
0 0 0 rk22

 .
As a result,
Akabcdijkl =
{
Rk2(c−1)+k,2(a−1)+i if b = d = j = l = 1, a = c, i = k
0 otherwise.
So the only relevant dimensions for player I are χ1111 and χ2121. We
now recall the conditions imposed on χ, which are
∑
i χijij = 1 and∑
i χijil = 0. We therefore see that χ1111 + χ2121 = 1. Similarly,
ξ1111 + ξ2121 = 1. Therefore, playing the above quantum game is the
same as playing the classical game with the game matrix below:
Ak =
(
rk11 r
k
12
rk21 r
k
22
)
.
In summary we have shown that playing games quantum mechan-
ically can be more efficient, and have given a saturated upper bound
on the efficiency. In particular, there is a factor of 2 increase in ef-
ficiency. We have also deduced the quantum version of the minimax
theorem for zero-sum games and the Nash theorem for general static
games. In addition, we have shown that finite classical games con-
sist of a strict subset of finite quantum games. We have also pointed
out the essential characteristics shared by static quantum and static
classical games—these are the linearity of the payoff function and the
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convexity and compactness of the strategy sets. Indeed, the success
of using linear programming to search for Nash equilibira in classical
two-player zero-sum games relies on these characteristics—one would
suspect the same method could be applicable to the quantum ver-
sion as well [5]. Our final words would be a cautious speculation on
the possibility that the physical and natural world might already be
exploiting this efficiency advantage on the microscopic scale [12].
CFL thanks NSERC (Canada), ORS (U.K.) and Clarendon Fund
(Oxford) for financial support.
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